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Science-Policy Disputes:
Resolution Through Data Mediation
Erik S. Knutsen*
I. INTRODUCTION
An increasing number of important and influential legal disputes are relying on
the interpretation of complex yet uncertain scientific information in coming to a
resolution. Parties involved in obstetric and gynecological medical malpractice
claims often require cutting-edge medical evidence to make difficult determinations
of fault or cause.' Parties in toxic torts like asbestos-related claims2 also rely on
somewhat ambiguous scientific research in order to establish a myriad of facts
regarding liability, from latency periods to future impact on childbearing. 3 Products
liability cases like those involving defective breast implants,4 the Dalkon Shield7
6
5
intrauterine device, the Agent Orange defoliant, and most recently tobacco
typically require judges and juries to make difficult and controversial policy
conclusions from highly technical scientific data. The resolution of environmental
resource allocation disputes also rests on speculative interpretations of sometimes
indefinite biological and ecological data. Most of the disagreement within these
types of disputes stems from differing understandings and perspectives about
seemingly innocuous hard science. In fact, scientific information in complex disputes
is often anything but innocuous. It is subject to interpretation, error, bias, and the
whims of competing policy goals of the disputants. Disputes that involve policy
conclusions from uncertain scientific information are therefore difficult to resolve
because of the reliance on human interpretation of data. These disputes often involve

controversial, time-sensitive issues, affect great numbers of stakeholders, are
expensive to resolve because of their complexity, and are unpredictable in outcome.

*. Copyright 2001 by Erik S. Knutsen, H.B.A. (Lakehead University), LL.B. (Osgoode Hall Law
School), LL.M. (Harvard Law School), Adjunct Professor and Visiting Assistant in Law, Florida State
University College of Law. The author wishes to thank Professor Frank E.A. Sander, Bussy Professor of
Law at Harvard Law School, Dr. Robert N. Green of Accident Reconstruction Associates, and Kristopher
H. Knutsen, Q.C., Fellow of the American College of Trial Lawyers and mediator with Bridge North
Mediation Services, for helpful thoughts regarding the early stages of this article. The author also wishes
to thank Florida State University College of Law and its faculty for support in the publication process.
1. See e.g. Paul C. Weiler, Medical Malpractice on Trial (Harv. 1991).
2. See e.g. In re SchoolAsbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986); Hardy v. Johns'ManvilleSales
Corp., 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982).
3. See Linda S. Mullinex, Resolving AggregateMass Tort Litigation: The New PrivateLaw Dispute
Resolution Paradigm,33 Val. U. L. Rev. 413 (1999).
4. See e.g. In re Dow Corning Corp., 211 B.R. 545 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997); In re BreastImplant
Cases,942 F. Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); In reSilicone Gel BreastImplant Prods.Liab. Litig., 1994WL
114580 (N.D. Ala. 1994).
5. In re N. Dist. of Cal. Dalkon Shield I U.D. Prods.Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982).
6. In re "Agent Orange" Prod.Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 818 F.2d 187
(2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988). See also Peter H. Schuck, Agent Orange on Trial:
Toxic Disasters in the Court (Belknap Press of Harv. U. Press 1986).
7. Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995), rev'd, 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir.
1996).
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It is the aim of this article to propose a novel system of dispute resolution for
disputes which turn on interpretations of complex but uncertain scientific evidence.
Part II identifies a specific subset of legal disputes that can only be resolved through
policy judgments from ambiguous scientific data. Recognizing the underlying
commonalities of these science-policy disputes offers an opportunity to craft a single
dispute resolution mechanism which may be utilized for a wide variety of disputes.
Part III outlines the benefits of using a mediation-based dispute settlement
mechanism, as opposed to the traditional adversary-style litigation system, for these
specific types of disputes. Part IV proposes a model mediation system for disputes
turning on policy-based interpretations of complex scientific information. Part V
concludes by applying the model to a fictional products liability dispute which
involves conflicting scientific determinations from technically complex data.
II. CLASSIFYING THE SCIENCE-POLICY DISPUTE
Disputes involving controversial scientific conclusions from ambiguous
data exhibit a number of common characteristics and present common challenges to
disputants and factfmders alike. When designing dispute settlement mechanisms, it
is therefore possible and indeed practical to craft solutions which can be portable to
a variety of complex scientific disputes.
A. The Science-Policy Dispute
Disputes which turn on the interpretation of complex and sometimes
uncertain scientific data are often difficult to manage and even more difficult to
settle.8 Judges and juries are required to make conclusions from highly technical
data. They will likely not agree on the conclusions reached from the data. They may
not even agree on what, in fact, is the relevant data. The divergence of opinions
about the scientific information is greatest when there may not be one clear answer
stemming from the science, but rather many answers. Interpreters of the data, often
experts in the field, are then required to use their professional judgment to choose
what they believe is the most likely answer from the range of answers. Important
elements of a scientific dispute like cause, fault, and risk potential may not be
apparent but may exist on a continuum of cause, fault, or risk potential. Different
experts may choose different points on that continuum for different reasons. That
choice may be both highly controversial and based more on policy considerations
than on accepted scientific methodology. 9

8. See Connie P. Ozawa, Recasting Science: Consensual Procedures in Public Policy Making
(Westview Press 1991) for a thorough outline of the unique qualities that set the science-policy dispute
apart from other disputes.
9. Indeed, Lawrence Susskind notes that the key barriers to most agreements in science-based disputes
are "inappropriate responses to scientific uncertainty." Lawrence Susskind, Barriers to Effective
Environmental Treaty-Making, in Barriersto Conflict Resolution 293, 303 (Arrow et al. eds., 1st ed.,

W.W. Norton 1995).
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For example, a power company wishing to construct a new hydroelectric
dam must be approved by governmental agencies before it can proceed with
construction. Often, concerned parties like local citizens' groups, aboriginal
communities, and environmental interest groups participate in the approval system.
A dispute emerges. In order to pass approval, the power company must determine
the effect of the dam on the water quality, fish, wildlife, and soil condition, as well
as the dam's noise and pollution potential. The results of the ensuing risk assessment
depend on the way the proffered scientific evidence is interpreted. Some scientists
may make a more conservative estimate than others as to risk potential.'0 Divergent
views from the same data are likely to clash. Different scientific experts may utilize
different methodology, different theoretical frameworks and may have different
underlying political interests in allowing or halting the building process. Indeed, the
data may be skewed toward furthering the power company's economic interests and
an independent data collector may be required. There is also no guarantee that an
independent data collection will rule out bias, as seientific conclusions must still be
drawn from the data. Impasse occurs because the disputants cannot agree on the
deciphering of scientific data.
The challenge in resolving these types of situations is to gain consensus on
the policy behind the interpretation of uncertain scientific information. Relevance
of data, research methodologies, theoretical perspectives, professional experience,
as well as error and bias all affect the outcome of a scientific interpreter's
conclusions. Because these disputes rely not on objective measurements from
scientific data, but on interpretive judgment of that data, they are more sciencepolicy disputes" than purely scientific disputes. Their often controversial and
competing conclusions further heighten their policy underpinnings. Therefore, these
science-policy disputes are unique in that they deal with gray policy conjectures
rather than black and white scientific facts. They require sensitive treatment
throughout the entire dispute process.
B. Complexity, Expense, and Unpredictability
Disputes turning on interpretations of scientific information are usually very
complex. Many factors and considerations affect the various conclusions that need
to be made from the scientific facts. Often parties may not even agree on what is a
relevant scientific fact. The amount of technical information can seem
overwhelming. For example, in tobacco products liability disputes, medical
information regarding chemical toxicity levels to humans of second-hand tobacco

10. For example, Lawrence Susskind describes a Boston Globe survey which asked scientific experts
their opinions about the global warming debate. Of those interviewed, thirteen percent stated an
unstoppable greenhouse effect was likely, thirty-two percent believed a greenhouse effect was possible,
and forty-seven percent said the effect was unlikely. Id. at 303 (citing David Chandler, FearExpressed
of Runaway GreenhouseEffect, Boston Globe § 3 (Feb. 10, 1992)).
11. Milton R. Wessel discusses scientific disputes that incorporate sociological factors into the
decision-making process. He dubs them "socio-scientific controversies." Milton R. Wessel, Adversary
Science andthe Adversary Scientist: Threats to Responsible DisputeResolution, 28 Jurimetrics J. of Law,
Science & Tech. 379 (1988).
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smoke is juxtaposed with information about other carcinogenic risk factors in a
smoker's environment like pollution, diet, and genetic susceptibilities. Expert
scientists must make predictions on the likelihood that the product is inherently
dangerous to smokers and those who are around the smoke. Sorting out the potential
risk factors to determine accurate and acceptable readings of the risk levels is a
Herculean task because so many interdependent scientific factors are involved.
The outcome of a science-policy dispute is often hard to predict, especially
if the dispute enters the litigation system. The complex scientific subject matter is
difficult for lay juries and judges to understand. When coupled with conflicting
expert testimony, the unpredictability increases. Litigation costs are prohibitive.
Information exchange through fact-finding and discoveries involve complicated
information and research, requiring expensive scientific expertise. Trials may go on
for months or years. Appeals are nearly always automatic. With expenses so high,
the outcome so unpredictable, and the policy conclusions from the scientific
information so important, a litigdfted science-policy dispute becomes a high-stakes
gamble for all parties involved.
C. ControversialNature
Science-policy disputes tend to be controversial in nature. Often, one
competing scientific theory or method must be chosen over another. Conclusions
about the uncertain scientific information may in fact be made through competing
choices of scientific, economic, cultural, and ethical policy. Not all disputants may
share the same perspectives about choices of applicable interpretive policy.
Determining whether a certain chemical is carcinogenic, or whether the harvesting
of a section of forest harms endangered species involves enormous scientific,
economic, cultural and ethical policy considerations beyond just reading hard data.
The ramifications of choosing one interpretation may be controversial as well as
wide-reaching. Injured plaintiffs may be precluded from compensation,
manufactured products may be banned from consumer usage, whole industries may
be put out of business, and precious natural resources may irreparably suffer. A high
degree of emotional and political heat usually accompanies these disputes. 2 There
is therefore a great deal of power and responsibility involved in resolving sciencepolicy disputes ethically and fairly.13 The impact of policy conclusions based on
scientific information may shape future disputes relying on similar science.

12. See Deborah R. Hensler, A Glass HalfFull, A GlassHalf Empty: The Use ofAlternative Dispute
Resolution in Mass PersonalInjury Litigation, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1587, 1596 (1995).
13. For an understanding of the power dynamics involved in science-policy disputes, see generally
Ozawa, supra n. 8.
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D. Multiple Parties
Science-policy disputes typically involve more than two parties, further
complicating the disputing process. Party participation, and sometimes even party
identification, can become difficult to manage. A medical malpractice action may
involve not only the patient and primary care physician but other medical specialists,
the hospital, and the hospital staff. There may be large numbers of plaintiffs in toxic
torts and products liability cases, which is the primary reason why most of these
disputes are litigated as class actions. Indeed, some affected plaintiffs may not even
know they have a valid claim.' 4 Environmental resource allocation disputes can
involve parties from government and industry, as well as aboriginal groups,
concerned citizens' coalitions, and environmental interest groups. The multi-party
nature of the dispute makes the dissemination of scientific data an important step in
the resolution process. A stakeholder in a science-policy dispute cannot fully
participate without adequate access to information. Settlement option generation
depends on this informational exchange. Furthermore, informed settlement decisions
depend on an understanding of the conclusions based on the scientific information,
whether those decisions are made through an adjudicatory or consensual process.

E. Timeliness
Time is usually of the essence in these types of disputes. In injury cases
such as medical malpractice and toxic torts, plaintiffs can wait years for needed
compensation and usually require immediate financial assistance to cope with their
injuries. In products liability cases, the importance of timeliness is heightened by the
fact that there may be dangerous products still in public use. Any disputes involving
the computer and high technology industry have an added time pressure as the
technology progresses at a breakneck rate and a prolonged dispute over technical
information is strategically threatening to the business parties involved. 5
Environmental disputes are extremely time-sensitive as environmental harm can be
accumulating and resources depleting while parties dispute. 6Therefore, sciencepolicy disputes benefit from an efficient and early resolution.

14. Many science-policy disputes, in particular products liability and toxic torts, affect a great number
of people. Long periods of latency are often common in these cases. Potential plaintiffs may not know
that they have a valid legal claim unless they are informed of the possibility through either the media or
class action notices. Richard Delgado identifies this "indeterminate plaintiff' phenomenon in Beyond
Sindell: Relaxation ofCause-in-FactRulesforIndeterminatePlaintiffs,708 Cal. L. Rev. 881 (1982). The
mediation process may be more conducive to coming to an agreeable method of communicating with
potential plaintiffs. The number of plaintiffs seeking compensation from defendants may be more
reasonably defined through guidelines developed in a consensual process. At the same time, the parties
can balance the preservation of the rights of those plaintiffs as yet unidentified but still deserving
compensation.
15. See e.g. Clive V. Allen, ComparativeAspects of Dispute Resolution in Technology Matters, 17
Canada-U.S. L.J. 309 (1991). Allen notes that early resolution is vital to scientific disputes in the
computer industry, as the technology undergoes massive changes in five to six month intervals.
16. See e.g. Thomas J.Klitgaard & William E. Mussman III, High Technology Disputes: TheMinitrial
as the EmergingSolution, 8 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 1 (1992).
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F. RequiredExpertise
Science-policy disputants also require some technical expertise in order to
assist with fact finding and interpretation of scientific information. Expert witnesses
are usually involved to assist with this, though the disputing stakeholders themselves
may also hold expertise. It is the experts who usually advance the policy conclusions
from the data; therefore, they tend to exhibit a great deal of informational power in
science-policy disputes. Lay disputants are captive to their determinations. Experts
also function as educators of the parties, drafting opinion reports and assisting with
fact-finding processes. Partisan parties will often involve their own experts in the
dispute, usually hiring one expert for each relevant field of science. The experts'
facts and conclusions are weighed against those of the other experts in an attempt to
discern viable conclusions from the scientific data. Some expert opinions may be
discounted and other opinions upheld. Measuring credibility of an expert is difficult
because most parties lack the technical expertise to evaluate an expert's findings.
There is a constant danger of valuing the best spokesperson over the best scientist.17
G. InformationalImbalances
Information imbalances usually exist among the parties and make the entire
disputing process more frustrating, more unpredictable, and more prone to
unfairness. 8 A patient in a medical malpractice dispute usually has no medical
knowledge and must rely on experts and her counsel to assist in this regard. Unlike
the physician or hospital defendant, the patient usually has difficulty in locating an
expert willing to testify against a fellow medical professional.' 9 Consumers in
products liability cases are at an extreme informational disadvantage compared to
manufacturer defendants who have access to all the manufacturing information,
product history, and product testing research. Lay citizens and aboriginal groups who
may be stakeholders in environmental disputes do not have ready access to the same
scientific expertise as do industry and governmental stakeholders. Aside from
immediate access to scientific information and expertise, the economic disparities
existing between parties enable some parties to gain needed information and
expertise, while keeping others from accessing the same advantages because of lack
of financial resources.

17. E. Lyle Gross warns of the "hired gun" perception of expert witnesses in a traditional litigation
setting and advocates the incorporation of experts into the mediation process in order to avoid this
adversarial taint to the expert's involvement in the dispute. E. Lyle Gross, The Expert Witness and
Mediation, 34 Alberta L. Rev. 69 (1995).
18. See Robert B. Wilson, Strategicand InformationalBarriersto Negotiation,in Barriersto Conflict
Resolution 108 (Arrow et al. eds., 1st ed., W.W. Norton 1995). Wilson analyzes game theory and
economic models of litigation, mediation, and arbitration situations to demonstrate that lack of
information and information imbalances can prevent settlements and create costly delays. Mediation is
the better forum for overcoming this difficulty with differing parties' access to information.
19. See e.g. Joseph Kelner, The Silent Doctors - The Conspiracyof Silence, I U. Rich. L. Rev. 119
(1967); Weiler, supra n. 1.
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H. Importance of Causation
Many science-policy decisions involve findings about causation. 0 Causal
determinations usually hinge on interpretation of scientific information. Often, cause
is uncertain and many multiple causes for a certain event or injury may seem
apparent. Because the available science may not point to one clear cause, causation
may actually exist on a continuum. Difficulty arises when disputants must pin down
one source of cause on this continuum in order to resolve the dispute. For example,
obstetrical and gynecological medical malpractice claims typically hinge on
determining whether or not the physician's negligence actually caused the patient's
injury. To make that determination, parties must interpret complex medical
information about potential causes of the injury and the resulting likelihood that one
or more of the causes stemmed from the physician's negligent behavior. It may be
impossible to definitively prove with current science which potential cause was the
actual cause-in-fact of the patient's injury. Toxic torts, such as asbestos poisoning
cases, also turn on scientific information about causal latency and causal potency.
Products liability cases demand that disputants analyze scientific data about the
potential of harm caused by a defectively manufactured product. The cases involving
breast implants, the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device, Agent Orange defoliant, and
tobacco all involved voluminous amounts of controversial causal information. And
even environmental resource allocation disputes require that parties analyze and
interpret scientific information about cause and effect of stresses on natural
resources. Causal judgments based on ambiguous causal science become prone to
the policy judgments and differing opinions of those who have the power to interpret
and understand the science.
III. BENEFITS OF EARLY MEDIATION
Science-policy disputes are usually resolved through the litigation system.
Because the scientific conclusions from uncertain information are controversial and
malleable, plaintiffs and defendants often believe that each has a valid case.
Litigation becomes lengthy, protracted, and expensive. The adversarial nature of
fact-finding can result in unpredictable and sometimes even incorrect conclusions
being made from the scientific data. Expert witnesses are pitted against expert
witnesses and their theories are challenged and subjected to incompatible legal, nonscientific standards of proof. Lay juries and judges are forced to interpret complex
technical information which they often do not fully understand. And most often,
success lies in who has the most dramatic expert witness as his or her spokesperson.
Early mediation of the scientific issues in the dispute may help to alleviate
much of the shortcomings of the litigation system. Mediation may in fact be an ideal
process for dealing with controversial disputes that must grapple with uncertain
science-policy conclusions.

20. See e.g. Deborah R. Hensler, Science in the Court: Is There a Role for Alternative Dispute
Resolution?, 54 L. & Contemp. Probs. 171 (1991).
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A. Reducing Complexity, Expense, and Unpredictability
Early mediation may help to narrow the issues in dispute, assisting the
parties in reaching settlement sooner by focusing efforts and resources on the critical
areas of impasse. It may also foster some agreement early on in the dispute.
Scientific process issues can be resolved before major interpretations of the evidence
occur. Disputants can determine what information is still required, what criteria will
be used for information evaluation, what research methodologies are acceptable, and
what margins of error are tolerable. Unlike litigation, the mediation process also
allows disputants to carve up various scientific issues in a flexible way, isolating
important factors and making determinations in the order the parties wish.2 The
consensual, problem-solving ideology of mediation is ideal for driving group efforts
in fact-finding, which may propel resolution of science-policy disputes.
Mediation may also be a less expensive alternative to litigation. There is
less opportunity to sabotage the process with costly legal procedures and delays. And
parties can construct the process, keeping cost considerations in mind. This kind of
cost control is non-existent in a litigated court case in the public justice system.
The mediation process deals more effectively with uncertainties in factfinding. Because science-policy disputes involve conclusions from ambiguous
scientific data, a consensual approach to making science-policy conclusions may
make for more opportunity to construct flexible, contingent solutions. Parties are not
required to come to one final answer, as they are in the litigation system; rather,
answers to scientific questions can remain on a continuum ofpossibilities, providing
parties agree on the ramifications of fact-finding in this manner. Fact-finding does
not have to be based on absolutes but can proceed despite the fact that analyses may
sometimes point to several answers. The only limits to the fact-finding process are
imposed by the parties themselves and their ability to come to agreement.

B. Managing Controversy
The mediation forum is better suited to dealing with policy conclusions that
can spark controversy, emotion, and political turmoil. Unlike the courtroom,
mediation provides an outlet for emotion and heated debate. With the assistance of
a skilled mediator, parties can explore the non-legal and non-scientific emotional,
ethical, political, and cultural aspects of the dispute. For example, in a medical
malpractice claim, apology may play an important transformative role for both
patient and physician." There is also greater opportunity for understanding the

21. Id.
22. See e.g. Ann J. Kellett, HealingAngry Wounds: The Roles ofApology andMediation in Disputes
Between PhysiciansandPatient,,1987 J. of Dis. Res. 111 (1987); Catherine S. Meschievitz, Mediation
andMedicalMalpractice:Problemswith Definition andImplementation,50 L. & Contemp. Probs. 195,
197 (1991). See also Robert A. Baruch Bush & Joseph P. Folger, The PromiseofMediation: Responding
to Conflict Through Empowerment and Recognition (Jossey-Bass 1994). Bush and Folger believe that
mediation can have a transformative effect for disputants, empowering them to understand the dispute
on their own while at the same time allowing them to recognize the root of the conflict. Apology is one
of the ways the authors note this transformation can occur.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2001/iss2/3

8

2001]

Knutsen: Knutsen: Science-Policy Disputes
Science-Policy Disputes

unique cultural perspectives of aboriginal groups affected by environmental disputes
when the parties can hear the concerns of the affected groups themselves. Reading
complaints on paper is never the same as hearing the complaint from the party. The
ability of a party to verbally vent its concerns may spur the dispute closer to
settlement by offering further insight into the true nature of the dispute. Skillful use
of caucuses by the mediator may enable communication between parties who were
previously unwilling and unable to communicate.
Creative solution generation which incorporates emotional, ethical,
political, or cultural concerns can also be pursued in a mediation setting. The control
of information through both confidentiality agreements and agreed monitoring ofthe
news media may help to quell concerns about the controversial aspects of the
dispute. Communication and information exchange agreements amongstparties may
also help alleviate some emotional and ethical fears about whether or not the relevant
data will be divulged.
C. Involving Multiple Parties
A more participatory setting like mediation may be better suited to disputes
which involve multiple parties, each of whom must address complex and technical
scientific issues. The mediation process can be specifically designed to accommodate
the participation and interaction of a variety of parties. The parties themselves have
an opportunity to air concerns and listen to opposing views. Most importantly,
parties can be present to hear each others' conclusions about the relevant scientific
data. Criticisms and commentary can help unite some divergent interpretations of
scientific information and can educate parties about differing perspectives.
Early mediation may help break down positional bargaining and build
consensus among the parties. Where appropriate, relationships among the parties
may be better maintained through a consensual problem-solving forum like
mediation, as opposed to an adversarial proceeding like a court.23 For example,
stakeholders in an environmental resource allocation dispute often have to continue
to work together in a cooperative fashion after settlement is reached. A patient in a
small community may still have to continue to attend a hospital that patient has sued
for malpractice.
D. Efficient Use of Time
Early mediation may also force parties to assess the viability of the dispute
before too much time passes and before formal dispute processes like litigation are
initiated. Earlier agreement may be prompted by the mere fact that parties are forced
to both assess the viability of their claims and communicate with one another.
Furthermore, the mediation process can be streamlined to address the most
contentious issues first, increasing the chances that a major portion of the dispute
will be resolved without parties initially getting bogged down in trivialities.

23. See Hensler, supra n. 20, at 188.
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E. Required Expertise
Mediation is much more conducive to the open forum ofscientific inquiry.24
Scientists can explore possibilities and hypotheses in an environment that fosters
information exchange and debate. Allowing scientists to remain in a comfortable,
non-inquisitorial environment may actually lead to more accurate policy
prescriptions from scientific data because data may be subjected to scientific
standards of proof rather than less rigorous legal standards of proof." Experts who
wish to avoid the adversarial setting of the courtroom may be more agreeable to
participation in a mediation forum. Their credentials will not be challenged as in
open court. They will not be subject to typical courtroom-style cross-examination.
And the testimony they give will not be torn apart or twisted in a way they do not
wish without affording them an opportunity to clarify their ideas.

F. InformationalImbalances
Informational imbalances between parties can be better addressed in a
mediation setting. Parties can be encouraged to actively participate in the process and
a mediator can assess whether or not there exists an informed understanding of the
relevant scientific information. Because parties can be present to listen to differing
perspectives, and because they can ask questions and challenge those perspectives,
informational gaps have a greater tendency to close in mediation. Parties may be
encouraged to more readily bring scientific information and conclusions to the table
in mediation. In litigation, the adversary nature fosters an environment of
concealment and ambush. 6
IV. A MEDIATION SYSTEM FOR SCIENCE-POLICY DISPUTES
In order to address the unique challenges facing disputants in science-policy
disputes, early mediation should be incorporated into the disputing process. The
proposed model is a flexible, context-sensitive two-step mediation. The first step
involves a preliminary data mediation stage 7 where data is gathered, issues are

24. Id.
25. See generally Thomas B. Metzloff, Alternative Dispute Resolution Strategies in Medical
Malpractice,9 Alaska L. Rev. 429 (1992).
26. Elizabeth Sherowski cautions that, in order to submit some disputes to a mediation-type process,
a trial lawyer culture change must occur. Lawyers must change tactics from a winning at all costs
approach to an approach more conducive to finding a functional solution to the dispute. This culture
change may be most difficult in personal injury science-policy disputes thatare steeped in the adversary
tradition, like medical malpractice claims or products liability class actions suits. See Elizabeth
Sherowski, Hot Coffee, Cold Cash: Making the Most ofAlternative Dispute Resolution in High-Stakes
PersonalInjury Lawsuits, II Ohio St. J. on Dis. Res. 521, 529 (1996).
27. See generally Lawrence S. Bacow & Michael Wheeler, EnvironmentalDispute Resolution, 27 103 (Plenum Press 1984) (discussing data negotiation in environmental disputes); A.J. Pirie, The Lawyer
as a Third PartyNeutral: Promise and Problems,in Commercial DisputeResolution: Alternatives to
Litigation (D. Paul Emond, ed., 1989) (suggesting data mediation procedures to break deadlocks over
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narrowed, and criteria for information evaluation are developed. Policy conclusions
from the data are initially discouraged at this stage.28 The second step involves a
mediation of the dispute which incorporates the fimdings and agreements of the data
mediation. Parties can now begin to develop and debate interpretations of the data.
Depending upon the nature of the dispute, this second mediation could either involve
a neutral expert witness as educator of the parties, or sets of adversary experts
present at the mediation. The dispute resolution mechanism centers around
facilitating fair and efficient information flow while ensuring participation and
education of the parties.

A. Step One: Data Mediation Stage
The first step in the science-policy mediation process is a preliminary data
mediation confined to exploring the scientific issues of the dispute. This mediation
is refined in scope as it does not canvass solutions for all issues in the dispute but is
constrained to a distillation purpose only. It attempts to consolidate efforts to
interpret the uncertain scientific information.2 9
Data mediation is a process restricted to narrowing scientific issues and
establishing common ground about the scientific information involved in the
dispute.30 Parties and their experts come together through the assistance of a neutral
mediator. Information gathering and information sharing is fostered through the
consensual, problem-solving environment of mediation. Data mediation is designed
to break deadlocks over:
"relevancy and accuracy of data;
"means of determining what data will be used;
" criteria for evaluating data;
" differing perspectives on research design;
" methods of communicating data and conclusions; and

relevancy and accuracy of factual information to be used in the decision-making process).
28. This two-step mediation process is similar to the concept of pre-settlement settlement, or PreSS,
as discussed by J.J. Gillespie & Max H. Bazerman in Pre-Settlement Settlement: A Simple Technique
for Initiating Complex Negotiations, 14 Negot. J. 149 (1998). PreSS involves using a formal, initial
mediation process before the main mediation in an-attempt to resolve a sub-set of important issues
contained in the dispute. See also Scott Forehand, Helping the Medicine Go Down: How a Spoonful of
Mediation CanAlleviate the ProblemsofMedicalMalpracticeLitigation, 14 Ohio St. J. on Dis. Res. 907,
919 (1999) (advocating for mediation as a first step in medical malpractice claims); Jeffrey S. Brenner,
Alternatives to Litigation: Toxic Torts andAlternative Dispute Resolution - A Proposed Solution to the
Mass Tort Case, 20 Rutgers L.J. 779, 814 (1989) (calling for a bifurcated fact-finding process akin to data
mediation, where screening panels first gather information about the dispute and then parties proceed to
a summary trial).
29. Francis McGovern recounts three varieties of science-policy disputes which involved an initial
process for narrowing scientific issues with the assistance of experts: an environmental resource dispute
involving the Great Lakes waterways, an energy crisis dispute, and adispute involving asbestos litigation.
See Francis McGovern, Towarda FunctionalApproachforManagingComplex Litigation, 53 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 440, 456-93 (1986).
30. For a discussion about the importance of consensus in agenda setting, problem formulation,
identification of solutions, and choice of decisions when attempting to resolve science-policy disputes,
see Ozawa, supra n. 8.
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3
- appropriate policy frameworks for data interpretation. 1
It is also useful in narrowing issues in dispute by identifying common ground
amongst the parties. Furthermore, the process can uncover workable alternative
solutions to help settle the dispute.
The process works best for disputes like science-policy disputes which
contain a sub-set of debatable issues. Before a science-policy dispute like a toxic tort
can be resolved, there is usually disagreement about how various technical facts will
be evaluated. Data mediation can streamline the disputing process by resolving these
preliminary concerns about scientific information before the greater issues of cause,
fault, and damages are addressed. Data mediation is also useful when parties reach
a costly impasse. When they are hopelessly countering each other, parties may be
made no worse off by attempting a data mediation, especially when the alternative
is to have no agreement at all.32 Finally, data mediation holds the potential to
facilitate agreement before the full mediation even takes place by bringing the parties
and information together earlier in the disputing process.

1. How Data Mediation Operates
Disputing parties appoint a mutually agreeable mediator.33 In the
alternative, a court-appointed mediator may suffice, if necessary. The parties meet
together with the mediator and bring to the mediation whatever relevant scientific
information they presently have. Some parties may wish that their experts attend the
mediation as well. This should be encouraged, owing to the highly technical nature
of these disputes.

31. The data mediation process may benefit from using a customized form of established legal
evidentiary guidelines for evaluating scientific evidence. The United States Supreme Court outlined five
factors for determining the quality of expert scientific evidence in Daubertv. MerrilDow Pharm., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579, 593-95 (1993). Disputants should use Daubert-type criteria as a baseline in assessing
validity of a fellow disputant's scientific information. The Daubertfactors require a court to determine
the following: (1) whether or not the scientific methodology has been, or can be, tested; (2) whether the
methodology has been subject to peer review and publication; (3)what the known or potential rate of error
is for the methodology; (4) what is the availability and use of standards to control the methodology's
operation; and (5) to what extent the methodology is generally accepted in the relevant scientific
community. See generally id. These factors are easily adaptable to a consensual mediation process and
offer a framework for discussions about the relevance and quality of the proffered data. They can also
easily be expanded to include other criteria important to the resolution of the dispute. For doctrinal
analyses of the Daubert decision and its gatekeeping effect on scientific evidence, see Bert Black, The
Supreme Court's View of Science: Has Daubert Exorcised the Certainty Demon?, 15 Cardozo L. Rev.
2129, 2137 (1994); Kenneth R. Foster & Peter W. Huber, Judging Science:Scientific Knowledge and the
FederalCourts 115-30 (M IT Press 1997).
32. J.J. Gillespie & Max H. Bazerman, supran. 28. Gillespie and Bazerman note that pre-mediation
processes work best when their utilization is Pareto-superior. In other words, parties should attempt to
use pre-mediation processes when it is clear that entering into the process will not be detrimental to any
parties and will likely make at least one party better off than it is without attempting data mediation.
33. Whether the mediator should be skilled in the scientific subject matter of the dispute is debatable.
See e.g. Gross, supra n. 17, at 69 (canvassing the benefits and detriments of the expert mediator);
Metzloff, supra n. 25 (arguing that the alternative dispute resolution community should be providing
mediators who are knowledgeable in the types of issues that arise in mediation).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2001/iss2/3

12

Knutsen: Knutsen: Science-Policy Disputes
2001]

Science-PolicyDisputes

An initial agenda for the data mediation should set out the realistic goals
of this pre-mediation process as well as reasonable timeliness to reach those goals.
Next, parties must determine what information is required to settle the dispute, what
information is readily available at present, and who is required to help interpret that
information. Parties may invite further scientific experts to the mediation table and
the fact-gathering process begins. Experts from all sides of the dispute may present
their conclusions and question each other. They should, however, refrain from
making controversial policy conclusions from uncertain scientific information. That
activity will be accomplished in the second mediation stage. The presence of the
parties as well as their experts adds an important participatory element in this group
fact-finding process. This, in turn, fosters ownership on the part of the disputants of
any agreements reached.
Once the differing perspectives of the parties are aired, the parties must then
work together to determine how they will proceed with the scientific information and
conclusions presented. Evaluation criteria must be developed. Issues should be
narrowed. Common ground should be identified. What is known and knowable
should be separated from what is unknown and unknowable. Often, the fundamental
disagreement between parties is not on the scientific facts themselves but on the
methods of analysis of those facts.34 Competing scientific theories and methodology
mesh with opinions of various experts and stakeholders to create disagreements of
not only scientific accuracy but of personal, political, and ethical bias. Parties must
attempt to reach some consensus about how they will interpret the scientific
evidence. At a minimum, parties can agree to disagree about some subjective
elements of the dispute, including what policy frameworks each party will use in
interpreting the scientific information. Once relevant data is located and criteria for
its evaluation are developed, the parties may agree on how to proceed with the rest
of the disputing process despite facing fundamental disagreements about data
interpretation.
2. Problems with Data Mediation
A preliminary data mediation stage is not without its weaknesses. Its utility
must be evaluated in each case before it is applied to a science-policy dispute. Data
mediations may add extra expense and delay to the disputing process. That expense
may be unnecessary if the dispute is headed to litigation in any event. Expert witness
time is extremely costly and it may take some time for any agreement to be reached.
However, disputants must carefully evaluate the possibilities that agreements reached
in the data mediation stage may save costly discovery time and avoid procedural
legal battles in the future. The process also allows a valuable preliminary look at the
other party's information and positional stances.
Data mediation also requires full and frank disclosure of sometimes
controversial scientific information. Parties may lose valuable tactical advantages in
exposing their information. For example, a manufacturer will be reluctant to turn

34. See Lawrence Susskind & Jeffrey Cruikshank, Breaking the Impasse 160 (Basic Books 1987).
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over its secret product test results unless it is forced by a court to do so. This
difficulty may be somewhat alleviated by a confidentiality agreement incorporated
into the data mediation which compels all parties not to use the data gleaned from
the process for litigation purposes. Furthermore, no party is forced to give up his or
her right to sue regardless of the outcome of the mediation. The data mediation
process may actually indicate that the litigation system35 is the only appropriate
forum for the dispute. Because the data mediation process is flexible and can be
designed around the unique challenges of science-policy disputes, it should often be
the case that science-policy disputes will derive a benefit from the process that is at
least worth the extra time and cost involved in attending.
B. Step Two: Policy Mediation Stage
After the data mediation stage, parties should next proceed to the main
mediation component which is not limited to preliminary data management. The
issues identified and conclusions reached at the data mediation should now be
brought forward and discussed in the context of the entire dispute. The policy
conclusions and prescriptions from the scientific information can now be debated in
this forum, tempered only by the limits agreed upon at the data mediation stage. This
stage is a typical full-blown mediation with one necessary addition: scientific
experts.
1. The Importance of Experts
The importance of including the scientific experts in the policy mediation
stage cannot be overstressed. The experts likely played a crucial role in the data
mediation but are still necessary to the process in resolving a science-policy dispute.
The parties require the presence of experts in order to further interpret, validate, and
educate. Experts may still need to interpret scientific data that has become relevant
after the data mediation. They may also still present their differing perspectives
about technical issues that were not resolved in the previous stage of the process.
They will be called upon for their policy conclusions based on the agreed relevant
scientific facts and boundaries from the data mediation. Experts will need to assist
parties in assessing various settlement options and predicting outcomes of potential
future actions. Most important, experts are vital to continuing the educational efforts
of the data mediation. The presence of experts can also help overcome the
informational imbalances among the parties by acting as both educators and
disseminators of information.

35. For cautions about relying too heavily on mediation and neglecting the potential utility of the
current litigation system in complex disputes like science-policy disputes, see e.g. Judith Resnick,
ProceduralInnovations, Sloshing Over: A Comment on Deborah Hensler, 'A Glass Half Full,A Glass
HaIfEmpty: The Use ofAlternative Dispute Resolution in Mass PersonalInjury Litigation', 73 Tex. L.
Rev. 1627 (1995); Kenneth R. Feinberg, Response to DeborahHensler, 'A GlassHalfFull,A Glass Half
Empty: The Use ofA lternative DisputeResolution in Mass PersonalInjury Litigation', 73 Tex. L. Rev.
1647 (1995). See generally Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073 (1984).
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2. Incorporating Experts Into the Policy Mediation

There are two possible ways experts could be incorporated into the policy
mediation stage. The first involves choosing a mutually agreeable neutral expert to
act as both policy prescriber and educator of the parties. Alternatively, the second
involves using adversary experts. Each method has advantages and disadvantages.
The decision to proceed with one neutral expert or with adversary experts rests with
the disputing parties. They must be able to accurately weigh the benefits and
potential risks of proceeding with either option. The proper forum for making this
decision may be in the data mediation.

Option 1: The Neutral Expert
If possible, a neutral expert agreed upon by all parties could serve the
process best.36 Conflicting expert reports and testimony from the data mediation
could still be tendered by the parties. The third party neutral expert would read and
evaluate the conclusions and facts and come to his or her own policy conclusions
based on his or her professional judgment, the reports and findings of the parties'
separate experts, and the agreed findings of the data mediation. These policy
conclusions would then be debated amongst the parties who have been present at the
data mediation. The expert would assist in educating the parties about the technical
aspects of the case and would be available to explain his or her policy conclusions.
Several advantages exist with utilizing a single neutral expert in this
fashion. If a single expert can be agreed upon, the expert can play a more actively
facilitative role in the dispute. For example, the expert can ask questions of the
parties directly, can engage in educating the parties about his or her policy
conclusions from the scientific information, and can even make inquiries to other
experts present at the data mediation. Having a single, neutral and knowledgeable
source control what happens with the scientific information allows the mediation to
proceed efficiently and with cohesion.
Choosing the best expert available may also avoid the 'hired gun' syndrome
of expert witness shopping that is so prevalent in litigation today.37 Perhaps more
experts who are not comfortable in a courtroom environment would lend themselves
to a policy mediation as they avoid the unpleasant experience of adversary crossexamination. This practice may also break down the stereotype of experts being
plaintiff or defense sensitive and may attract better qualified experts who exhibit less
courtroom showmanship but are more learned in their field. The policy mediation
process is also akin to the free-flowing, scientific inquiry process in which many
academics are used to working.

36. If there is more than one major scientific issue involved in the case, two or more neutral experts
may also be necessary but this option should be avoided if possible. However, these neutrals will be
responsible only for the issues pertaining to their particular areas of expertise. See infra Option 2:
Adversary Experts.
37. See Gross, supra n. 17.
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However, it is likely that parties may not be able to agree on one particular
expert despite the advantages. The second option of using adversary experts may
therefore be necessary. 1Lmay also be difficult to choose one neutral expert if the
science-policy dispute involves a number of areas of scientific inquiry. An
environmental dispute, for example, could touch on areas of biology, ecology, and
chemistry, and various sub-specialties like ornithology, ichthyology, and
dendrology. Products liability disputes may involve chemists, medical experts, and
engineers. A drawback in choosing a single neutral expert is the fact that the expert
represents only one theoretical perspective on the scientific issues. The parties are
subject to the expert's biases and policy perspectives. This may be tolerable, indeed
sometimes desirable, if the parties are fully aware of the expert's goals and
perspectives. If the parties do not know enough about the expert, there is a risk that
the expert's policy conclusions from the scientific information may be skewed
against one party due to unarticulated theoretical or political preferences.
Option 2: Adversary Experts
If parties cannot agree on a single neutral expert, they must then resort to
adversary experts chosen by each party individually. While the adversary experts can
still function in many of the same beneficial ways as a single neutral expert, their
inclusion has some added challenges to the mediation process. Adversary experts
should still operate in an educative capacity. They are still required to make policy
conclusions within the parameters of the results of the data mediation; however, they
do so in a more partisan way. Each party's expert presents his or her policy
conclusions separately. Experts can then challenge the conclusions of fellow experts.
The mediator's most important task is to mediate between the experts. The mediator
can help identify commonalities among the differing perspectives. He or she can ask
for clarification or assist in posing hypothetical situations to the experts.
The parties, too, are involved in the evaluation of each expert's policy
conclusions. Each party can question its own expert or the experts of other parties.
Again, it is up to the mediator to maintain a facilitative environment as the
information is exchanged. With both parties and experts present, the mediation
should be able to effectively address the disagreements about even the most technical
scientific information. And with the data mediation having preceded the policy
mediation, parties are free to debate the difficult and controversial subject matter of
the dispute without getting mired in debating the technical qualities of the scientific
data.
Adversary experts inject a different tone into the mediation environment.
There are more opportunities for disagreement among the parties and experts as the
different players will advance conclusions that benefit their interests. Furthermore,
it may be impossible to avoid the 'hired gun' syndrome and perhaps whoever has the
expert most skilled at presentation may succeed in swaying other parties with his or
her policy conclusions, regardless of the scientific validity comprising the substance
of the presentation. Parties and their experts must be mindful of this tendency and
must critically evaluate any solutions posed. The scientific method is often accepted
too easily by the average disputant, who may not realize the underlying role of nonhttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2001/iss2/3
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objective judgments and personal bias in scientific disputes.3" While this danger
exists in the neutral expert option, it is increased due to the greater number of experts
present in a multiple adversary expert mediation where various experts are
competing for parties' attention.
V. SCIENCE-POLICY MEDIATION IN PRACTICE
The following fictional example demonstrates the effectiveness and
flexibility of the two-step mediation process for science-policy disputes.
A. The Defective Jaw Implant. The Facts
Mand-tech, a prosthetic device manufacturer, invented and marketed the
Mand707 partial jaw implant. The implant was designed to replace the lower portion
of the mandible bone in the jaw. The implant was tested in Mand-tech's laboratory
and believed to be safe. About one thousand Mand707 implants have been surgically
inserted into patients. Only one documented case of implant rejection exists and
reinsertion of the implant was successful. The implant is marketed throughout the
United States to surgeons and hospitals.
Martin Lucent received a Mand707 jaw implant to replace a bacteriadiseased portion of his jaw bone. He suffered trauma to his jaw in an automobile
accident and bacteria had badly damaged his lower mandible. Since implantation,
he has suffered from nausea, headaches, dizziness, and constant jaw pain. He had to
be prescribed a specific, powerful anti-inflammatory which eased the pain while not
causing him further adverse side effects. After a visit to three local implant
specialists, it was discovered that the implant had disintegrated in his jaw, likely
through no negligence of the operating physician. Lucent sued Mand-tech in a
products liability suit. Lucent's counsel knows of one other patient who is having
similar trouble with the implant. The counsel is looking to begin a class action.
Mand-tech insists its jaw implant is safe and that Lucent's surgeon
negligently installed the implant. Alternatively, Mand-tech asserts that Lucent's
unique enzymatic makeup, coupled with the mixture of powerful prescription drugs
he takes, is negatively affecting the jaw, causing Lucent's body to reject it.
B. The DataMediation
Representatives of Mand-tech, Mand-tech's counsel, and Lucent and his
counsel agreed to mediate the dispute through the science-policy mediation process.
At the data mediation stage, Mand-tech produced all clinical trial research for
examination by Lucent. Mand-tech also brought its top research scientists and a

38. See e.g. Lawrence Susskind, EnvironmentalMediation: Theory and Practice Reconsidered, in
Stephen B. Goldberg, Nancy H. Rogers & Frank E.A. Sander, Dispute Resolution: Negotiation,
Mediation, and OtherProcesses 1, 495 (3d ed., Aspen Law & Business 1995).
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specialist in implant surgery to the mediation. Lucent hired a local expert in jaw
implant surgery, at the recommendation of his counsel.
The parties and experts agreed to proceed by first examining the validity of
Mand-tech's clinical trials and then gathering information about other jaw implants
generally. Mand-tech's experts agreed to exchange a scientific opinion report with
Lucent. Lucent's expert did the same. The reports conflicted as to the precise cause
of the implant disintegration. Mand-tech's report stated the cause was due to the
negligence of Lucent's surgeon in installing the implant. Mand-tech asserted that the
surgeon must have created a non-sterile environment, splashing some unknown
chemical agent on the implant or mishandling it in some fashion which eventually
caused its breakdown. Lucent's expert report claimed the implant was defectively
manufactured in that the chemical composition of the implant was unstable and unfit
for human implantation. Both obvious and perceived bias seemed to taint the reports.
The mediator had some difficulty in controlling the positional bargaining nature of
the dispute and the parties seemed deadlocked in their opinions. However, the
mediator was able to point to common ground: the heart of the dispute itself. Both
parties were meeting impasse at the same issue.
It quickly became clear that the dispute rested on the cause of the implant's
failure. If Mand-tech's jaw implant was soundly built, then Lucent would have no
claim against the manufacturer. Mand-tech's clinical research trials appeared valid,
and its scientific experts seemed credible. However, neither party could specifically
point to the direct cause of the failure. The experts could only offer conjecture.
The parties agreed to narrow the mediation to the distinct issue of whether
or not there was any reasonable possibility of biomechanical failure of the implant.
The proper scientific sphere concerning the dispute was agreed to be not surgery but
biochemistry, specifically the interaction of high-impact plastics with the human
body and bacterial agents. Any theories for the implant failure had to pass a number
of criteria formed by the parties' consensual agreement. A theory must be
statistically significant of more than one in ten thousand to be considered relevant,
it must come from a credible, mutually trusted source, the data used in the theory
creation must be the data agreed by both parties to be valid, and the conclusions of
the theory were not to be made public unless the parties mutually agreed to do so.
The mediator was able to convince the parties to disclose all information
gathered at the data mediation to Swedish biochemist Dr. Lars Olafson, the leading
expert in the biochemistry of implant rejection. Dr. Olafson was a respected and
world-renowned expert who refused to testify in court, not wishing to subject
himself to unpleasant cross-examination and his theories to unscientific methods of
legal proof. Both Mand-tech's and Lucent's experts agreed he would be most
knowledgeable on the subject. Indeed, much of his research was cited in both Mandtech's and Lucent's expert reports. Dr. Olafson appeared to be a neutral expert and
was therefore asked to produce an opinion report on the matter and to attend the
policy mediation to debate his conclusions.
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C. The Policy Mediation
At the policy mediation, Dr. Olafson presented his conclusions in the
presence of the parties and their experts. He based his conclusions on the submitted
data which included product specifications of the implant as well as medical history
of Lucent. Dr. Olafson believed that the same bacteria that caused Lucent to lose his
lower jaw in the first place was also capable of destroying even high impact plastic,
providing the plastic was weakened with a specific anti-inflammatory drug like the
kind Lucent was prescribed. He said the combination of these factors caused the
Mand707 to disintegrate within Lucent's jaw. He estimated that, in an implant
recipient who had not yet contracted the bacteria until after the implant installation,
the chances of contracting the bacteria and being prescribed that specific antiinflammatory were extremely low, about one in five million. However, in those
recipients who had contracted the bacteria before, especially those who required the
jaw implant because of bone loss caused by the bacteria, the chances they would be
prescribed the anti-inflammatory were relatively high, about one in seven hundred.
Furthermore, Dr. Olafson surmised that there was little that could happen during the
operation itself that would cause the breakdown of the implant. He did not believe
surgical negligence was a factor worth considering.
Mand-tech and Lucent questioned Dr. Olafson about his conclusions,
specifically his statistical predictions. Mand-tech believed the probabilities to be too
high; Lucent believed them to be too low. The mediator was able to get agreement
on a middle ground probability after Dr. Olafson carefully explained his
methodology to both parties and experts alike. The mediator reminded the parties
about the uncertainty of the science and the greater uncertainty of success for either
party if the issue proceeded to litigation. The mediator also pointed out that the
information gleaned through Dr. Olafson benefited not only Mand-tech but Lucent
as well, who now understood a possible reason for his suffering.
Realizing that it faced potential liability exposure, Mand-tech agreed to
settle with Lucent for a large sum of damages. Furthermore, it agreed to recall the
Mand707 implant and send out a notice to implant recipients, warning them of the
dangerous combination of bacteria and anti-inflammatory drugs. In exchange,
Lucent would agree to keep the findings of the mediation confidential.
VI. CONCLUSION
Using the science-policy dispute resolution process enabled the parties to
effectively deal with highly technical scientific information. It also afforded room
to cope with the uncertainty of the science and allowed the parties flexibility in
crafting possible explanations based on the agreed upon facts. The process prompted
the parties to focus on the salient issue of the dispute and attempt to come to a
mutually agreeable solution. Different science-policy disputes may proceed
differently from the above example. Environmental resource allocation disputes may
require adversary experts at the policy mediation stage and a more prolonged data
mediation stage, perhaps even multiple data mediations for each scientific issue in
debate. Regardless of the precise category of scientific dispute, the science-policy
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mediation process offers a practical and portable methodology for resolving
controversial, high-stakes scientific disagreements.
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